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British Watchmaking Industry 
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Résumé Abstract 
Dans cet article, l'auteur identifie les facteurs 
qui ont mené au déclin de l'industrie horlogère, 
autrefois puissante, en Grande-Bretagne. D'une 
position dominante à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, 
alors que les horlogers anglais satisfaisaient à 
la moitié de la demande mondiale, l'industrie 
britannique est tombée à un modeste niveau 
dans la période qui a précédé la Première Guerre 
mondiale. Les producteurs étrangers ont d'abord 
concurrencé les fabricants britanniques dans les 
marchés étrangers puis les ont pratiquement 
chassés de leur propre marché. C'est la persis-
tance de vieilles technologies dans les centres 
d'horlogerie anglais de Londres, Prescot, Bir-
mingham et Coventry qui a mené à ce déclin 
fatal. La résistance au changement s'est ali-
mentée à des facteurs économiques, sociaux et 
culturels. En négligeant d'adopter les innova-
tions techniques mises au point en Suisse et aux 
États-Unis, et de s'adapter aux conditions chan-
geantes du marché, la technologie raffinée mais 
périmée de Grande-Bretagne s'est condamnée 
elle-même à disparaître. 
The commercial and technical achievements of 
classic British watchmaking were impressive. 
At the end of the eighteenth century Britain 
produced about half of the world's output of 
watches and had a thriving export market. The 
complex technology embodied in the chrono-
meter represented perhaps the greatest achieve-
ment of any handcraft industry. Simultaneously, 
at the bottom end of the market, thousands of 
rural clockmakers crafted the simple, cheap, 
reliable clocks which were among the first con-
sumer durables.1 But by the eve of the first 
world war, British watchmaking was in termi-
nal decline. Why? 
In this article the author identifies factors that 
led to the decline of the once-mighty British 
watch industry. From a dominant position in the 
late eighteenth century when English watch-
makers supplied half of the world's demand, to 
a low point in the pre-World War I period, for-
eign producers at first challenged domestic 
British manufacturers in foreign markets, then 
virtually drove them out of their home market. 
The persistence of old technologies in the 
English watchmaking centres of London, 
Prescot, Birmingham and Coventry led to this 
terminal decline. Resistance to change was 
fuelled by economic, social and cultural factors. 
By failing both to adopt technological innova-
tions developed in Switzerland and the United 
States and to adapt to changing market condi-
tions, the sophisticated but outdated technol-
ogy of Great Britain doomed itself to extinction. 
The Early Industry 
Whilst the clockmaking industry was ubiqui-
tous, watch manufacturing was concentrated 
in a few places, notably London, Prescot (near 
Liverpool), and Coventry. In the London dis-
trict of Clerkenwell, hundreds of master crafts-
men employed thousands of independent 
outworkers to produce almost 200 000 watches 
a year during the 1790s, the peak years of pro-
duction. Most units employed only a handful 
of workers. Tools were hand-held and hand-
powered, and the structure of the industry 
remained on the lines evolved by Tompion 
and others in the late seventeenth century. 
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There were at least a dozen major branches: 
makers of dials, pallets, pinions, springs, chains, 
screws, finishers, and so on. Each specialism 
was in turn further subdivided. The industry 
was well described by Aaron Dennison, the 
father of the American watch industry, but the 
same account could have been made at any time 
from the early eighteenth century to the eve of 
World War I: 
The party setting up as a manufacturer of 
watches bought his Lancashire movements -
conglomeration of rough materials - and gave 
them out to A, B, C, D, to have them finished. 
A, B, C, and D gave out the job of pivoting cer-
tain wheels of the train to E, certain other 
parts to F, and the fusée cutting to G. Dial-mak-
ing, jewelling, gilding, motioning, etc. to oth-
ers, down almost the entire length of the 
alphabet; and how that, taking these various 
pieces of work to outside workpeople - who, 
if sober enough to be at their places and were 
likely engaged on someone's work ahead of 
them, and how, under such circumstances, 
he would take the occasion to drop himself into 
a "pub" and drink and gossip and, perhaps, 
unfit himself for work for the remainder of 
the day...2 
This classic method of production and the 
essential structure of the industry in Britain sur-
vived long after new watchmaking methods 
were evolved elsewhere to make cheaper and, 
ultimately, better quality watches. Despite its 
great achievements the system had obvious 
and considerable limitations. The high cost of 
a typical Clerkenwell watch was not due solely 
to low labour productivity resulting from com-
plex handcraft technology. With few excep-
tions, by 1800 even the least expensive English 
watches normally included a fusée, which 
European competitors regarded as unneces-
sary for most ordinary production lines. A 
fusée was a device invented in the fifteenth cen-
tury to compensate or equalize the uneven 
force exerted by an unwinding mainspring. It 
was a cone-shaped pulley with a spiral groove 
of varying diameter on which was wound a tiny 
chain with miniscule links.3 
There was general agreement that if one dis-
counted cost and complication of assembly, a 
fusée was a superior device to its alternative, 
the going barrel. Fusées were invariably used 
in the best chronometers, for example. But it 
was an additional complication, and therefore 
an additional expense. Its chain could and did 
frequently break, necessitating irritating and 
expensive repairs. A going barrel simply dis-
pensed with this potential source of trouble: a 
sufficiently long mainspring was inserted, 
geared directly onto the wheel train, and only 
a portion of its potential unwind was used. It 
kept time adequately for most purposes, and 
was cheap and simple. Moreover, a fusée took 
up room inside the movement and necessi-
tated a fatter watch case (thereby also increas-
ing the amount and cost of the gold or silver 
used). Thick, heavy watches also became less 
fashionable than thin, light ones. Despite this, 
a fusée remained a quintessential feature of 
Clerkenwell's best watches. 
New Swiss Technologies 
The new watchmaking technologies which 
challenged the old came from Switzerland at 
the end of the eighteenth century and from the 
United States in the middle of the nineteenth. 
The first challenge came from the Swiss Jura at 
the very time that the English horologicaJ indus-
try seemed in the ascendancy. Swiss watches 
had been produced by a putting-out system 
similar to that in England.4 In Geneva the watch-
making industry had grown from a produc-
tion of about 5000 watches a year in 1685 to 
some 85 000 almost a century later. During 
the 1770s, however, production methods were 
revolutionized when Georges Frédéric Japy 
devised a system which, in effect, mass pro-
duced the rough movement or ébauche.5 By 
1777 Japy had designed machine tools and a 
production line that required only semi-skilled 
labour. Annual output from his works reached 
100 000 movements by 1800. Geneva finishers 
flourished thanks to the availability of cheap 
ébauches. But there were also other reasons 
why watches from the Jura and Geneva were 
cheaper than British watches. Just as important 
as standardized ébauches and lower labour 
costs was the adoption by Swiss and French 
watchmakers of the going barrel instead of the 
fusée, and a new, simpler and cheaper way of 
arranging the parts of the movement into a dif-
ferent pattern, or calibre, devised in the 1770s 
by Jean-Antoine Lépine.6 Lépine's layout became 
the standard for European watches; it was espe-
cially suitable for the new generation of watches 
whose rough movements originated in Japy's 
factories. These features helped Swiss makers 
to tap the new mass markets for watches which 
were developing in the early nineteenth cen-
tury as a result of rising incomes. 
A cheap Swiss watch with a going barrel 
instead of a fusée kept time to an adequate 
level of accuracy. For most Britons and others, 
58 
especially first-time buyers, it represented much 
better value for money. Sales of smuggled Swiss 
watches in Britain were at first measured in tens 
of thousands, but after 1850 the lowering, and 
then the disappearance, of tariff barriers swelled 
imports to millions. 
The American Challenge 
After 1858 the British watch market was also 
penetrated by the products of a quite different 
horological technology which had emerged in 
the United States. This was the method of mak-
ing clocks, and then watches, by what became 
known as the "American system." This reduced 
the hand-crafting techniques characteristic of 
classic horological technology to a minimum 
and then disposed of it almost entirely. To use 
Eugene Ferguson's widely accepted definition, 
the American system involved the "sequen-
tial series of operations carried out on succes-
sive special-purpose machines that produced 
interchangeable parts."7 Its origins lay partly in 
developments in the New England clock indus-
try in the early years of the nineteenth century, 
and partly in simultaneous developments in the 
region's small arms industry. Professor Houn-
shell has traced the diffusion of these produc-
tion techniques into various other consumer 
and producer goods industries, and Professor 
Rosenberg has stressed the importance of the 
emergence of a separate, specialized machine 
tool industry by the 1840s.8 
The American system achieved considerable 
successes in the production of wooden and 
metal clock movements. But factory production 
of watches was much more difficult. The tol-
erances required for watch parts were mostly 
beyond the capacity of the first generation of 
specialized horological machine tools; precision 
to 1:1000 inch and better was needed. The first 
successful steps towards such accuracy in the 
machine part production and watch assembly 
in factories was taken by the Waltham company 
in the early 1850s. Progress was slow, however.9 
In addition to technical problems there were 
financial and managerial crises, and the first 
examples of Waltham watches imported into 
Britain were contemptuously dismissed by 
Clerkenwell's craftsmen.10 
Twenty years later, new generations of 
improved machine tools had turned the in-
fant American watchmaking industry into a 
formidable giant and Clerkenwell was reeling 
under the impact. By 1880, for example, an 
American worker with a twenty ton punch 
could blank out about 10 000 wheels a day. Yet 
loyalty to the traditional technology persisted 
in Clerkenwell where wheels were still hand 
cut and finished. In the United States' watch 
factories, balances and springs as close to the 
desired standard as possible were made in vast 
quantities in large production runs. Hairsprings 
were sorted by strength and then matched to 
balance the wheels.11 In Clerkenwell, the old 
technology of fitting a hairspring to a balance 
wheel was a highly skilled, specialized task. 
In the manufacture of screws, which 
accounted for perhaps one quarter of the parts 
in a watch, Waltham's productivity increases 
were prodigious. Donald Hoke has recently 
explained how, under the American system, 
methods of producing screws changed from cut-
ting each screw by hand.12 In 1850, daily out-
put per worker amounted to about 1200 to 
1500. Several generations of screw cutting 
machines were subsequently developed. By 
1885, one operative at Waltham could look 
after six machines and produce 50 000 to 60 000 
screws per day. In 1854 it had taken 24 work 
days for Waltham to produce a watch; by 1907 
it took 1.37 working days and, as Hoke stresses, 
the quality of the product was greatly improved. 
British reactions to the Swiss challenge were 
organized by the Clockmakers' Company. Time 
after time the guild tried to persuade the gov-
ernment to protect the industry by enforcing 
trade laws aimed at preventing smuggling. But 
watches were notoriously easy to conceal, the 
smuggling trade was well organized, difficul-
ties of enforcement were prodigious, and the 
penalties for smuggling were derisory. Indeed, 
so trivial were they that the cost of insuring 
against potential seizure and fines became a 
small extra charge factored into the purchase 
price. British consumers wanted cheap watches 
and British shopkeepers were willing to deal 
in them. Moreover, the British government 
moved away from protectionism after 1820 
and lacked the will - as well as the capability 
- to control illegal watch imports.13 
For 30 years the Clockmakers' Company 
fought a hopeless rearguard action as the tide 
of smuggled Swiss watches rose. The idea that 
domestic production methods should be modi-
fied to enable British makers to compete on 
similar terms with the Swiss was dismissed out 
of hand. Among the most prominent reasons 
advanced in favour of retaining the old tech-
nology was national security. Only classic 
watchmaking technology, it was argued, could 
produce an adequate supply of marine chro-
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nometers for the Royal and merchant navies: 
it was necessary therefore to preserve and 
protect existing handcrafting skills. To reject 
classic technology might mean throwing out 
the baby with the bathwater. It was power-
fully persuasive argument at the time. Other 
arguments stressed the evils of factory pro-
duction and the dehumanizing features of fac-
tory labour.14 
The Ingold Episode 
The loyalty of Clerkenwell's independent, self-
employed craftsmen to the old technology can 
be seen in the Ingold episode of 1842^13. A 
turning point in the history of British watch-
making, it marked a decisive rejection of new 
ideas in favour of old methods. The episode 
concerned attempts by Pierre Frédéric Ingold, 
a Swiss watchmaker, to establish factory pro-
duction of watches.15 Born in Bienne in 1787, 
Ingold had served his apprenticeship with 
the great Abraham-Louis Bréguet and had sub-
sequently developed a number of machines 
to make watch parts. His first ventures to estab-
lish "factories" in Paris, Versailles and London 
during the 1830s had failed. In 1842 he tried 
again in London. His prospectuses for his 
proposed "British Watch and Clock Com-
pany" announced that he aimed to raise about 
£250 000 to buy and equip a factory in Soho, 
London. Using machine tools to produce watch 
parts, he planned an output of about 300 
watches a day - or between 70 000 to 100 000 
a year, approximately half the United King-
dom's then annual output of watches. Ingold's 
proposed watches resembled Swiss models in 
style and layout rather than English models: 
they were "quite slim for the period," and they 
did not contain a bothersome fusée. 
After a long and bitter dispute and despite 
the powerful support lent to it by the young ris-
ing star at the Board of Trade, William Ewart 
Gladstone, the bill which would have estab-
lished the company was defeated in parlia-
ment. After the defeat Ingold went to the United 
States where, curiously, he seems not to have 
had any connection with later American watch-
making developments. Finally returning to 
Switzerland, he died there, an old man, in the 
early 1870s, and is now mainly remembered for 
one of his machines, the Ingold fraise. 
Ingold's failure meant that the attitudes of 
craftsmen became even more entrenched at 
the very time when they might have taken a lead 
in developing new technology. Ingold's pro-
posals united even Clerkenwell's fiercely inde-
pendent outworkers. Exhibiting classic Luddite 
reactions, some of them stormed the proposed 
factory premises and broke windows. They 
well understood the potential threat posed by 
the proposed developments. Subsequently, 
expert analysis of Ingold's patent applications 
and some of the surviving prototype machines 
has shown that he could not immediately have 
produced a complete machine-made watch. 
His machine tools were essentially variations 
of existing tools, such as a turret lathe, and a 
press and stamping machine which cut blanks 
for cogged wheels and balance wheels from a 
strip of metal. Had his proposals been imple-
mented, however, they would have enabled 
their operators to produce more quickly than 
contemporary techniques allowed, and would 
have yielded parts for most of the watch. The 
final springing and adjustments would still, at 
first, have needed to be done by hand: an ele-
ment of craftsmanship would have survived. 
It is probable that production from the original 
machines would not have been trouble free, but 
it is likely that improvements and solutions 
would have emerged to overcome the difficul-
ties.16 Later versions of the machine tools would 
no doubt have proved superior. At the very 
least, centralized production on one site would 
have increased labour productivity. 
Ingold's defeat was decisive: the classic 
methods of production remained essentially 
unchanged in Clerkenwell up to the first world 
war. The only London firm to use machine 
tools to any extent was that of the Swiss broth-
ers P. & A. Guye.17 By about 1890 their 100 
workers had the use of 80 to 90 "automatic 
machines," with which they made watch parts. 
But the finishing, springing and timing of the 
Guyes' watches were still done by hand; they 
were consequently expensive. Their output 
of about 500 watches a month was but a frac-
tion of die 1000 or more watches a day being 
produced by contemporary giant American 
factories. 
The remainder of Clerkenwell's indepen-
dent watchmakers stubbornly opposed the 
introduction of any aspect of the American 
system. In 1858 they had formed the British 
Horological Institute (B.H.I.) to defend their 
interests, partly because of the inability of the 
Clockmakers' Company to do so, and partly 
because they recognized that the rising tide of 
imports represented a powerful commercial 
threat. But despite the valiant efforts of a few 
reformers, the B.H.I, itself mirrored the views 
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and prejudices of the great majority of crafts-
men and masters in Clerkenwell. So great was 
its loyalty to the old and hostility to the new, 
that the B.H.I, rejected the idea that its own 
sponsored classes instruct apprentices in the 
use of machine tools.18 
Other Experiences 
Outside Clerkenwell there was also much evi-
dence of the persistence of old horological 
technology and the failure to successfully trans-
plant new methods of production. In the other 
centres of horological manufacture, Prescot 
and Coventry, as well as in Birmingham (the 
location of many small industries), some at-
tempts to introduce new production methods 
were made. Very little information about 
the first efforts has survived. For example, a 
firm named the English Watch Company was 
founded in Birmingham during the 1870s, and 
survived for a year or two.19 It had emerged from 
the ashes of an earlier speculation, the Anglo-
American Watch Company, about which even 
less is known. These were the first explicit 
endeavours to copy the American system of 
watchmaking by buying-up and installing 
machines from a defunct American watch fac-
tory. A little later a German immigrant in Birm-
ingham, William Ehrhardt, fared somewhat 
better.20 He managed to persuade some horo-
logical outworkers to come together in a factory 
building, thereby effecting several simple 
economies of scale and organization. He intro-
duced machines gradually. By 1899 he em-
ployed 400 workers and made about 600 
watches a week. Further introduction of machin-
ery resulted in a reduction in the number of 
employees rather than in an increase in aggre-
gate output. Like the Guyes in London, Ehrhardt 
made more use of machinery to make watch 
parts, but the end product was still assembled 
and finished by hand. Neither Ehrhardt nor 
the Guyes really adopted the essential features 
of the American system, although it is in-
teresting to observe that the Americans also 
finished and assembled by hand.21 
The Persistence of Old Technology 
The most notable examples of the persistence 
of old watchmaking technology occurred in 
Coventry and Prescot, revealing the depth of 
social and cultural - as well as economic -
resistance to the adoption of new machines 
and methods. In Coventry the most conspicu-
ous feature of watchmaking in the last third of 
the nineteenth century was die persistence of 
scores of small firms which hung onto old 
methods of production, in cut-throat compe-
tition amongst themselves.22 This was despite 
several attempts to come to terms with new 
machine tools, of which the most notable was 
made by Rotherham, the city's oldest and 
biggest watchmaking firm.23 The company's 
exposure to the reality and implications of new 
American technology came through John 
Rotherham (1838-1905). In 1856, at the age of 
18, he had been sent to the United States by his 
father and grandfather to find out why the 
firm's American export market was declining. 
(Until about 1850 about half of Rotherham's 
watches had been exported, with the United 
States taking the largest share.) John's later 
account of his trip pointed with painful accu-
racy at the reasons for the collapse of the export 
market: 
J called on the large merchants in New York, 
and they showed me drawer after drawer of 
Coventry watches, not one of which would 
go. They had been sent out with insufficient 
care, and the cost of repairing them out there 
was so great that they simply lay there, and the 
people who bought them were disgusted, and 
so was I. 
Chastened, the young Rotherham then vis-
ited the newly established Waltham watch 
factory and returned home to alert English 
watchmakers to the threat posed by new Amer-
ican production methods. His warnings went 
unheeded. This was partly because the col-
lapse of American export orders was tem-
porarily offset by a new market in Australia, 
created by the gold rush. But John Rotherham 
was henceforth conditioned by his first view 
of the American system, and when he eventu-
ally took control of his family's firm he deter-
mined to introduce machine tools into the 
production process. In 1880, after further exam-
ination of Swiss and American machines and 
methods, he installed some new watchmaking 
machinery. American design influences could 
be seen in a new cutting engine ("for cutting a 
stack of escape wheels at a time"), which was 
"nearly identical with one which had been 
exhibited at the (London) 1885 Inventions 
Exhibition by the Waltham Company." At first 
the strategy seemed successful, for business 
expanded. Within ten years the factory em-
ployed 400 workers, including 100 women. 
Yet, for all of John Rotherham's progressive 
views, crucial features of the old technology 
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survived. The American system was only half-
heartedly embraced. Even after the introduction 
of machine tools, some watches were still 
made in the old way, in a part of the factory spe-
cially set aside for the hand assembly and 
finishing of a mixture of machine-made and 
handcrafted parts. The reasons lay partly in 
management's concern for their old workers. A 
benevolent, paternalistic owner-manager, John 
Rotherham lacked ruthlessness. Old and new 
systems coexisted for a time. The consequences 
are well illustrated in a later recollection by 
Hugh Rotherham - John's son - of what had 
happened when a very refined machine tool 
was introduced and standardized measure-
ments of 1/1000 inch were first discussed. An 
old worker, he said, 
insisted that it was quite impossible that there 
would be a thousandth part of an inch, and 
when I tried to explain it to him, although I took 
a hair out of his head, put it in a gauge, and 
showed him it measured 3/1000 thick (sic) 
he was still incredulous. 
As well as the persistence of such attitudes 
amongst the old workers, the case of Rotherham 
shows that there were also fundamental errors 
of judgement in the management's production 
strategy. For example, the firm tried to make 
watches for every sector of the market. The 
resulting series of models could be seen in the 
firm's display at the Paris exhibition of 1889. 
They ranged from very ordinary grades up to 
those which bore Kew Observatory "A" 
certificates. By 1890 Rotherham was making 
100 watches a day - a significant increase over 
the 150 a week recorded by Harriet Martineau 
during her visit to the factory in 1852. Even 
so, its productivity — and volume of output — 
was roughly similar to that of the Guyes and 
Ehrhardt. All were far below that of contem-
porary American factories. 
The Lancashire Watch Company 
The story of the Lancashire Watch Company 
(L.W.C.) is equally revealing of the reasons 
why old technologies survived the introduction 
of new ones. The L.W.C. was formed in 1888 
in Prescot, near Liverpool, as an attempt to 
rescue the district's rapidly declining watch-
component industry.24 The enterprise was 
explicitly modelled after the Elgin National 
Watch Company's factory in Illinois, which 
the firm's founder, T. P. Hewitt, had visited on 
a trip to the United States. Before 1893, when 
the L.W.C. employed 1000 workers, it pro-
duced watches at the rate of perhaps 60 000 a 
year, and about 50 000 a year between 1893 and 
1900. Output - and the firm's fortunes - then 
steadily declined and the firm was bankrupted 
in 1910. Thus, a firm which had been set up to 
produce cheap machine-made watches failed 
at the very time that Britain's annual watch 
imports approached two million. 
Like Rotherham in Coventry, the L.W.C. was 
less than wholehearted in its adoption of new 
technology, and many features from the past 
persisted. It took in old workers and some of 
their tools and methods, with ultimately fatal 
results. For example, to try to overcome initial 
hostility to the establishment of a factory where, 
for two centuries or more, independent crafts-
men had plied their trade in making parts and 
movements, Hewitt bought up all the inde-
pendent businesses and brought the displaced 
workers and many of their tools into his new 
factory. Because it took some time for the new 
machine tools to be delivered and installed 
when the factory began operations, "much of 
the early work ... was probably a continuation 
of making older Lancashire models until new 
designs could be introduced." Custom died 
hard and was, in this instance, encouraged to 
continue. 
But it was not just in manufacturing tech-
nology that the L.W.C. hung onto the past. Its 
production and marketing strategies were also 
antiquated. It allowed the price of its cheapest 
model, aimed at the bottom end of the market, 
to be fixed by the price of the competition 
(such as the Waterbury, "the watch that made 
the dollar famous") and not by its own pro-
duction costs. Thus the "John Bull" had a rec-
ommended retail price of five shillings; it sold 
to the trade at 3s. 9d. each. As Professor Alan 
Smith, the firm's historian, has observed, it 
was a wonder 
... how the company managed to produce 
them at all... from November 1909 to March 
1911 roughly 5000 John Bull watches were 
sold. At the trade price mentioned this would 
have brought back less than £1000 to cover 
overheads, materials, setting-up new tools 
and the wages of the employees! The John 
Bull was a desperate last effort to capture the 
market for cheap watches, and it was a dismal 
failure. Without the sale of tens of thousands 
the venture was doomed. 
There were, of course, other reasons for the 
firm's failure. Like Rotherham, the L.W.C. made 
too many models. It offered a standard range 
of eleven different calibres, or sizes, of watches. 
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Indeed, with various permutations, depending 
upon the numbers of jewels and quality, the 
company made well over 50 different watch 
models during its 21 years of existence. As 
Professor Smith has pointed out, each was 
available 
with alternative finishes to suit customers' 
needs ... To have kept in stock, until the very 
end, a range of watches and their parts which 
were going out of fashion fifteen years before 
seems ... illogical and unbusinesslike ... Had 
the company concentrated on a few basic 
designs and sizes and brought the manufac-
turing costs down to a minimum, they might 
have succeeded. 
The persistence of old marketing strategies 
could also be seen in the company's simulta-
neous production of a range of English wall 
clocks. They offered these in seven different dial 
sizes, between eight inches (20 cm) and twenty 
inches (51 cm), each of them in five different 
quality grades, with further permutations 
allowed for the kind of cases and other features. 
Because of the range of options, prices varied 
between 23s. 9d. for the smaller, cheaper grades 
to eight guineas for the best. As if this was 
not enough, the company also made "electric 
meters, counters, workmen's time registers, 
cycle gears, dies, lathes, and every description 
of small mechanism." 
The L.W.C. thus made itself the prisoner of 
potential demand for an extraordinarily large 
number of idiosyncratic consumer require-
ments. This prevented the proper develop-
ment of new manufacturing technologies and 
sensible production and marketing strategies. 
What the firm needed was a small range of 
standardized, mass produced and saleable 
products. In reality it was in a hopeless posi-
tion when competing with companies like the 
Swiss combines and the giant American watch 
factories that had jettisoned old production 
technologies in favour of new ones, and that had 
modernized their business practices. 
The Death of the British Industry 
The persistence of old production technologies 
resulted in the terminal decline of the British 
watchmaking industry. The 1907 Census of 
Production revealed that the watches made in 
British factories and large workshops totalled 
only 75 000.25 A further unknown number -
perhaps half as many again - were still pro-
duced by outworkers using the old handcraft 
methods in production units too small to be 
counted by census officials. But even the most 
generous estimates of their production would 
suggest that the aggregate output of the British 
watchmaking industry was far below that 
achieved during its years of peak production 
in the 1790s. By 1914 British watchmaking 
firms supplied probably less than 10 per cent 
of the domestic market for watches and, at 
most, accounted for about 20 per cent of its 
value. Between 1907 and 1914 annual imports 
rose from 2.5 to 4.5 million pieces.26 In little 
more than a century British watchmaking, once 
the embodiment of contemporary high tech-
nology, had become an anachronism. Its sur-
viving practitioners were virtually museum 
craftsmen in an age of machine-tool, assembly-
line production. 
A number of lessons can be learned from the 
failing fortunes of British watchmaking. First, 
it is clear that no matter how sophisticated its 
products may be, an old technology is doomed 
to extinction unless it can come to terms with 
changing production and market conditions. 
Clerkenwell's old technology was indeed very 
complex and, at its best, it produced prodi-
giously accurate chronometers. It was unable, 
however, to produce the very large number of 
cheap watches demanded by a mass market. 
Second, resistance to accepting new meth-
ods and a long delay in adopting new machines 
proved fatal. Once the momentum of technical 
innovation passed elsewhere - as it did after 
Ingold's failure - it strengthened the resistance 
and loyalties of those who practiced the old 
technology. 
Third, adopting just a part of a new system 
was insufficient. In the case of Rotherham and 
the L.W.C, simply bringing in some of the lat-
est machine tools did not guarantee commer-
cial success. Rather, as these cases illustrate, the 
realization that they were becoming mere 
machine minders instead of craftsmen simply 
deepened the incomprehension and hostility 
of workers who found themselves de-skilled. 
Benevolent, paternalistic management atti-
tudes led to the retention of some old workers, 
old tools and old methods, and failed to pla-
cate workers' hostility. Instead they helped to 
prevent the proper transfer of the entire system 
of technology which included the adoption of 
new production technologies, as well as new 
methods of distribution and marketing. 
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